I have spent some time in Latvia with the ARRC on its annual exercise, ARRCADE FUSION 15. The exercise was designed to tests the ARRC's 'ability to control simulated troop formations within a challenging and dynamic fictional scenarios'. Make sure you watch the video about the exercise.
In this contribution to the Research Handbook on Jurisdiction and Immunities in International Law (edited by Alexander Orakhelashvili), I explore how the rules of State jurisdiction and State immunity apply to foreign armed forces. What is the law of the flag? Why is the legal status of foreign military personnel not the same as that of tourists? Find out here!
I recently had the pleasure and privilege of convening a workshop on the legal aspects of hybrid warfare and influence operations at the Strategy and Security Institute of the University of Exeter in the United Kingdom. Held in collaboration with the NATO Office of Legal Affairs (many thanks to NATO Legal Adviser Steven Hill) and the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, the event brought together senior legal advisors and experts working in a national and international capacity over the course of one and a half days. The workshop was held under the Chatham House Rule. While this prevents me from describing the proceedings and participants in greater detail, I have written up my thoughts on the subject, shaped in part by the discussions we had at Exeter, in a blog post published at Lawfare.
The University of Exeter’s Strategy and Security Institute hosted a high-level workshop on 16–17 September 2015 to examine the legal implications of ‘hybrid warfare’. The event, convened in collaboration with the NATO Office of Legal Affairs and the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, brought together senior legal advisors and experts from across the UK and
The subject of hybrid warfare – a strategy which blends conventional and irregular means of warfare – has attracted considerable attention in recent years. While the concept and its practical implications remain the subject of debate, it is clear that legal considerations and arguments play an important element of hybrid conflict. However, so far the legal aspects of hybrid warfare have received only limited attention. To address this gap, I had the pleasure of convening an expert workshop at the Strategy and Security Institute of the University of Exetetr in collaboration with the NATO Office of Legal Affairs and the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps. The workshop brought together senior legal advisors and experts from across the UK and NATO in an effort to deepen our understanding of the subject and set the direction for future work. I intend to take forward some of this work in the context of a research project on the legal aspects of hybrid warfare.
As the English Court of Appeal breaks for the summer vacation, scores of international lawyers are about to descend on one of its latest decisions: Mohammed v Secretary of State for Defence; Rahmatullah and Ors v MoD and FCO [2015] EWCA Civ 843. In this 109-page long judgment, the Court upholds the conclusion reached at first instance by Leggatt J that British armed forces participating in ISAF lacked the legal authority under international law to detain suspected insurgents captured in Afghanistan.The implications of Serdar Mohammed are considerable. The case raises difficult questions about the place the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) occupies in the international legal order and, more broadly, about the relationship between international human rights law and international humanitarian law (IHL). Those who have followed this debate will recall that we were not convinced by Leggatt J’s reasoning on these points (see here, here and here). In so far as it upholds his main conclusions, we also find ourselves in disagreement with the judgment now delivered by the Court of Appeal. Rather than rehearsing our arguments on the underlying issues in full (see in detail here), in this post we would like to briefly comment on those aspects of the Court’s decision which, in our view, take the debate forward and those which do not.
Noëlle Quénivet (UWE Bristol) and myself have just published SSI Occasional Paper No 2, entitled ‘Human Rights and Military Operations: Confronting the Challenges’. The paper summarizes the findings of a workshop held in February 2015 as part of a British Academy-funded research project we are conducting on the impact of international human rights law on the British armed forces.
In July 2015, I gave a presentation on the international law aspects of drone warfare at St Athan in Wales. I focused primarily on the questions arising under the rules governing the use of force (jus ad bellum) and those governing the conduct of hostilities (IHL). One of the points I emphasized was that unmanned aerial vehicles are not unlawful weapons systems as such, a point which by now seems to be generally accepted. However, I also suggested that the actual use of these systems does raise a number of legal difficulties.
In this article, I argue that the European Court has taken one step forward in the Jaloud case by introducing the notion of full command into the debate on extra-territorial jurisdiction, but two steps back by sowing unnecessary confusion with regard to the applicable rules of attribution.
Judicial imperialism is defeating the British armed forces. At least this is what the authors of a report recently published by the Policy Exchange, an influential British think tank, claim. There is little doubt that the British armed forces are facing significant legal challenges. These must be addressed as a matter of priority. However, neither the fiery tone of the Policy Exchange's latest report nor its actual policy recommendations are best suited to preserve the operational freedom of the military. In this post, we seek to explain why this is so.
