Does a notice to withdraw from the EU pursuant to Article 50 TEU have to be in written form? The Treaty of Lisbon has left this question open. In its second paragraph, Article 50 TEU declares that a ‘Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention.’ Nothing in this passage dictates that the notice has to be made in writing, yet nothing indicates that it may not be made in writing either. However, three points should be borne in mind in this context.
Trident Juncture 16 was my fifth exercise with the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). This year, the ARRC returned to RAF St Mawgan, just outside of Newquay in Cornwall. The purpose of the exercise was to evaluate NATO Joint Force Command HQ in Naples before it assumes the role of the headquarters for NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) in 2017. The exercise was also designed to certify that the ARRC is ready to assume the role of the Land Component Command of the VJTF next year.
‘There is no going back.’ These were the words of Lord Pannick, uttered before the High Court in response to the question whether the United Kingdom could rescind its notification to withdraw from the European Union once issued under Article 50 TEU (Santos and M v Secretary of State for Exiting The European Union, uncorrected transcripts, p. 17). The claimants and the Government appear to agree on this point and accept that the UK cannot reverse its notification of withdrawal. This post explains why this position does not reflect the law.
Speaking at the annual conference of the Conservative Party on October 4, U.K. Defence Secretary Michael Fallon sought to reassure Britain’s nervous allies and the general public about the implications of Brexit. Leaving the European Union, he said, “does not mean we are stepping back from our commitment to the security of our continent.” [...]
Earlier this year, human rights charity Reprieve published a report entitled ‘Britain’s Kill List. In its report, Reprieve claims to reveal shocking proof that exposes the involvement of the British Government in a global assassination project. In particular, Reprieve alleges that the British Government has been complicit in preparing and executing a ‘kill list’ [...]
On 21-23 June 2016, the International Society for Military Law and the Law of War (ISMLLW) and Exeter Law School convened an international conference in Exeter, United Kingdom, entitled ‘The International Law of Military Operations: Mapping the Field’. The conference brought together more than 130 legal experts from academia and the armed forces to map the current state of operational law from a comparative and practical perspective and to explore some of the most pressing legal challenges facing the conduct of military operations.
At the end of April, I spent a few days time in Warsaw attending the EUCOM/SHAPE international legal conference. The theme this year was 'The Legal Aspects of the National Security Response to Russian Aggression'. My presentation explored the topic of 'Lawfare on the Home Front'.
Gerd Oberleitner, Human Rights in Armed Conflict: Law, Practice, Policy (Cambridge University Press, 2015, 431 + xx pp, £109.99) ISBN 9781107087545, Hardback. Today, it is widely recognised that human rights continue to apply in times of war. However, the implications of this principle remain contested. The international community is deeply divided about the proper role [...]
This year's ARRC legal conference (ARRCADE BRIEF 2015) focused on the legal challenges presented by hybrid warfare threats. The confernece built on the workshop on hybrid warfare I convened in collaboration with the ARRC in Exeter in September 2015, as well as the lessons learned during exercise ARRCADE FUSION 2015. Read on for a summary of the event by the ARRC public affairs team.
In this comment, I offer some thoughts in response to Butch Bracknell’s recent post on the targeting of ISIL oil transport trucks by the US in eastern Syria. As has been reported in the New York Times, the aircraft carrying out these strikes have issued advance warnings to persuade the drivers to abandon their vehicles before the attacks commenced. Bracknell accepts that a number of policy reasons militate in favour of issuing advance warnings in the present case. However, he suggests that such warnings were not in fact required by the law of armed conflict.It is useful to revisit this assessment, partly because the legal and policy consideration seem to be more closely aligned than Bracknell’s conclusion suggests and partly because the case brings to light some interesting aspects of legal inter-operability.